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I. INTRODUCTION
W E CONSIDER two multi-user models: the multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with one helper (WTH) where the transmitter, the helper and the legitimate receiver have N antennas each, and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 1 , and the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT), where both transmitters and the legitimate receiver have N antennas each and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 2 . In both cases, the channel is fast fading and the channel gains vary in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) fashion across the links and time. We consider the case when the eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI) is not available at the transmitters (no eavesdropper CSIT). Our goal in this paper is to investigate the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of the MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT channel as a function of N and K .
To that end, we provide an achievable scheme based on vector space alignment [1] , that attains Therefore, for the regime K ≤ N, there is no loss of s.d.o.f. for the WTH due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT. Further, the proposed scheme which does not require eavesdropper CSIT, is optimal. The achievable scheme for the WTH also suffices as an achievable scheme for the MAC-WT channel, since we can treat one of the transmitters as a helper and use time-sharing among the two transmitters.
To prove the optimality of the proposed scheme for the MAC-WT channel, we next provide a matching converse for the regime K ≤ N. Besides using MIMO versions of the secrecy penalty lemma and the role of a helper lemma [2] , the converse proof relies on exploiting channel symmetry at the eavesdropper. Since the transmitters do not have the eavesdropper's CSIT, the output at the K antennas of the eavesdropper are entropy symmetric [3] , i.e., any two subsets of the antenna outputs have the same differential entropy, if the subsets are of equal size. Finally, we use a MIMO version of the least alignment lemma [4] , [5] , which states that the differential entropy at the output of the terminal which does not provide CSIT is the greatest among terminals having equal number of antennas. Intuitively, this holds since no signal alignment is possible at the output of the terminal which does not provide CSIT.
The converse in the regime K ≤ N shows that the sum s. (2N − K ) ; therefore, as in the SISO case [6] , [7] , which is a subset of this regime with N = K = 1, the MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH when the eavesdropper's CSIT is not available. Recalling that with full eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT channel in this regime is min(N, 2 3 (2N − K )) [8] , [9] , this also illustrates the loss of s.d.o.f. for the MAC-WT channel due to the lack of eavesdropper's CSIT.
Next, we consider the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N. In this regime, we provide an upper bound which shows that the sum s.d.o.f. of the MAC-WT channel cannot be larger than 0090-6778 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. [10] , [11] .
In order to further investigate the optimality of 1 2 (2N − K ) as the sum s.d.o.f. for the MAC-WT channel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N, we then restrict ourselves to linear encoding strategies [12] , [13] , where the channel input of each antenna in every time slot is restricted to be a linear combination of some information symbols intended for the legitimate receiver and some artificial noise symbols to provide secrecy at the eavesdropper. We show that under this restriction to linear encoding schemes, the linear sum s.d.o.f. can be no larger than 1 2 (2N − K ). The key idea of the proof is that since no alignment is possible at the eavesdropper, the artificial noise symbols should asymptotically occupy the maximum number of dimensions available at the eavesdropper; consequently, the dimension of the linear signal space at the eavesdropper should be K n + o(n) in n channel uses.
Related Work: The MAC-WT channel is introduced in [14] , [15] , where the technique of cooperative jamming is introduced to improve the rates achievable with Gaussian signaling. Reference [16] provides outer bounds and identifies cases where these outer bounds are within 0.5 bits per channel use of the rates achievable by Gaussian signaling. While the exact secrecy capacity remains unknown, the achievable rates in [14] - [16] [2] , when full eavesdropper's CSIT is available. References [6] , [7] , and [19] show that without eavesdropper's CSIT, the optimal s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with M helpers is still M M+1 , while the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the K -user MAC-WT channel decreases to
The MIMO WTH, with full eavesdropper CSIT is considered in [10] , [11] , and [20] , and the optimal s.d.o.f. is determined for the case when the transmitter and the receiver each has N antennas, the helper has K antennas and the eavesdropper has M antennas. References [8] , [9] , and [21] determine the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the two user MIMO MAC-WT channel when each transmitter and the receiver have N antennas while the eavesdropper has K antennas, and full eavesdropper CSIT is available.
A related line of research investigates the MIMO wiretap channel, the MIMO MAC-WT, and the MIMO broadcast channel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper [22] - [24] , when the eavesdropper CSIT is not available. The eavesdropper's channel matrices are assumed to be arbitrary, without any assumptions on its distribution, and security is guaranteed for every realization of the eavesdropper's channel. This models an exceptionally strong eavesdropper, which may control its own channel in an adversarial manner. When K ≥ N, the eavesdropper's channel realizations may be exactly equal to the legitimate user's channel realizations, and therefore, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in this regime for both the MAC-WT and the WTH. When K ≤ N, and the channel matrices to the legitimate receiver are full rank, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N − K for both the MAC-WT and the WTH. The converse is essentially immediate since the eavesdropper's channel realization may be exactly equal to the channel realization of the first K antennas of the legitimate receiver, and therefore, only N − K s.d.o.f., corresponding to the N − K remaining antennas at the legitimate receiver can be achieved. On the other hand, in our model, the entries in the eavesdropper's channel matrices are drawn from a known continuous distribution, though the realizations are not known at the transmitters. Note that the achievable schemes proposed in [22] - [24] for the worst case channel also work in our case; however, they are not optimal. In fact, we show that, in our case, strictly positive s.d.o.f. can be achieved even when K ≥ N, using interference alignment techniques. Further, the s.d.o.f. achieved in our case when K ≤ N is strictly larger than the optimal s.d.o.f. of N − K for the case with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper. Since, our channel model enlarges the achievable rate region by using a less pessimistic probabilistic channel model, the converse proofs in [22] - [24] do not hold in our case. Therefore, we provide novel converse proofs which rely on the interplay between channel symmetry, the secrecy penalty lemma, the role of a helper lemma, and the least alignment lemma. We also provide a novel converse proof for the case of linear encoding schemes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider two fundamental channel models: the MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT. In each case, we assume that the channel gains are non-zero and are drawn from a common continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion in each channel use. The common continuous distribution is known at all the terminals in the system. We assume no eavesdropper CSIT, that is, the channel gains to the eavesdropper are not available at any transmitter. In the following three subsections we describe each channel model and provide the relevant definitions.
A. Wiretap Channel With a Helper
The MIMO WTH, see Fig. 1 , is described by,
where X 1 (t) and X 2 (t) are N dimensional column vectors denoting the input of the legitimate transmitter and the helper, respectively, Y(t) is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver's channel output, and Z(t) is a K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper's channel output, at time t. In addition, N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with at time t. The entries of H i (t) and G i (t) are drawn from a fixed continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every time slot t. We assume that the channel matrices at the legitimate receiver, H i (t), are known with full precision at all terminals (including the eavesdropper), at time t. However, the channel matrices to the eavesdropper, G i (t) are known only at the eavesdropper and not known at any transmitter. All channel inputs satisfy the average power
, where X denotes the Euclidean (or spectral) norm of the vector (or matrix) X. Note that since we are interested in the s.d.o.f. (rather than the rate), assuming individual power budgets of P and α P, α > 0 will not affect our results. This fact can be verified by noting that neither the achievable scheme nor the converses are sensitive to scaling of the power by a positive constant. Further, if one imposes a total power budget P, the s.d.o.f. remains unchanged as long as each transmitter is allocated a strictly positive fraction of the total power budget P. Thus, there is little loss of generality in the simplifying assumption of equal individual power budgets, as we have done here. The transmitter wishes to send a message W , uniformly distributed in W , securely to the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. The helper has no information about the secret message W . A secure rate R, with R = log |W | n is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W =Ŵ ] ≤ n , for i = 1, 2, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
where n → 0 as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. d is said to be achievable if a rate R is achievable with
B. Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The two-user MIMO MAC-WT, see Fig. 2 , is as follows: where X i (t) is an N dimensional column vector denoting the i th user's channel input, Y(t) is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver's channel output, and Z(t) is a K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper's channel output, at time t. In addition, N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with 
where
is said to be achievable if a rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable with
The sum s.
C. A Linear Secure Degrees of Freedom Perspective
In this paper, we also consider linear coding strategies as defined in [12] and [25] . In such cases, the degrees of freedom simply represents the dimension of the linear subspace of transmitted signals. This is especially useful in the regime when the number of eavesdropper antennas K exceeds the number of receiver antennas N, since the general upper bound we propose for this regime is not matched by the achievable scheme, as we will see in Section III. However, restricting to linear encoding schemes allows us to use linear algebraic techniques and prove a matching converse for the class of linear encoding schemes. Thus, the proposed achievable scheme, which is linear, is optimal in the class of linear schemes. The motivation for considering the class of linear schemes is twofold: First, to the best of our knowledge, all alignment based schemes existing in the literature fall in the category of linear encoding schemes, as we formalize later. Second, the class of linear schemes are interesting from a practical point of view, since it includes all linear precoding schemes employed in wireless communication schemes.
When we focus on linear coding schemes, we consider a communication scheme of blocklength n, where transmitter i wishes to send m i (n) information symbols v i ∈ R m i (n) to the legitimate receiver reliably and securely. In case of the WTH, m 2 (n) = 0. Each information symbol is a zeromean Gaussian random variable with variance α P, where α is a constant chosen to ensure that the power constraints are satisfied at each transmitter. In addition to the information symbols, transmitter i can use n i (n) artificial noise symbols, u i ∈ R n i (n) each of which is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance α P. These artificial noise symbols need not be decoded at the receiver; instead they drown out the information symbols at the eavesdropper for security.
At each time t, the information symbols v i at transmitter i are modulated by a precoding matrix P i (t) ∈ R N×m i (n) , while the artificial noise symbols u i are modulated using a precoding matrix Q i (t) ∈ R N×n i (n) . Since the channel gains H i (t), i = 1, 2 are known at both transmitters at time t, the precoding matrices P i (t) and
However, since the channel gains G i (t) are not available at any transmitter, P i and Q i are independent of {G i (t), t = 1, . . . , n}.
At time t, transmitter i sends a linear combination of the information and the artificial noise symbols:
The channel outputs at time t are, therefore,
Note that for the WTH, m 2 (n) = 0, which transmitter 2 has no v 2 , and therefore, no P 2 (t). In other words, X 2 (t) = Q 2 (t)u 2 . The channel outputs will be modified accordingly in a similar fashion. Now
, we can compactly write the channel outputs as
whereH i andḠ i are the Nn×Nn and K n×Nn block diagonal matricesH
At the legitimate receiver, the interference subspace is
Let I c B denote the orthogonal subspace of I B . If we ignore the additive Gaussian noise, i.e., in the high transmit power regime, the decodability of v 1 and v 2 at the legitimate receiver corresponds to the constraint that the projection of the subspace colspan
This can be rewritten as requiring that
On the other hand, at the eavesdropper, the security condition can be stated as
The security requirement in (18) can be reformulated as follows: Let L(n) be the number of leakage dimensions defined as
Then, we want
In other words, we want the artificial noise symbols to occupy the full received signal space at the eavesdropper asymptotically.
The quantity L(n) may be thought of as the evaluation of lim P→∞ I (v 1 ,v 2 ;Z) 1 2 log P for the input-output relation stated in (13) . To see this, we use [7, Lemma 1], which we state here for completeness.
Lemma 1: Let A be an M × N dimensional matrix and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X N ) T be a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance PI. Also, let N = (N 1 , . . . , N M ) T be a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance σ 2 I, independent of X. If r = rank(A), then,
Using Lemma 1, we have
which implies
In a similar way, the decodability requirement in (17) can be thought of as ensuring that lim P→∞ 
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result of this paper is the determination of the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. for the MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT channel. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For both the N × N × N × K WTH and the MAC-WT channel with no eavesdropper CSIT, the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. d lin s is
for almost all channel gains. Further, without any linearity constraints, the optimal sum s.
We also have the following corollary. The proof of the corollary follows from the observation that every point in the given region can be achieved by time sharing between the points Similar to the SISO case [7] , as shown in Fig. 3 , the MIMO MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH when the eavesdropper CSIT is not available for the regime 0 ≤ K ≤ N, and at least from a linear s.d.o.f. perspective in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N. However, unlike in the SISO case [7] , the linear s.d.o.f. for the WTH decreases due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT. Even without any linearity constraints, the optimal s.d.o.f. for the WTH does decrease due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, as can be seen from the general upper bound in Fig. 4 , especially in the regime We note that the same upper bound of min(N, (2N − K ) + ) can also be obtained by a different genie-aided enhancement where the helper's channel input is provided to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is restricted to treat the helper's signal as noise, following the lines of [26] . Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 also show the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the WTH and the MAC-WT with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper. When K ≥ N, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is zero in this case since with K = N, the channel matrices of eavesdropper channel may be made exactly equal to the channel matrices of the legitimate receiver's channel. When K ≤ N and the legitimate receiver's channel matrices are full rank, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N − K for both the MAC-WT and the WTH. Thus, we achieve a strictly larger sum s.d.o.f. in our case where the entries of the eavesdropper's channel matrices are drawn from a continuous distribution and security is guaranteed on average, and not for every realization.
Corollary 1: For the N × N × N × K MAC-WT channel with no eavesdropper CSIT, the linear s.d.o.f. region is given by the set of all nonnegative pairs
Finally, the assumption of equal number of antennas N at all the legitimate terminals is for simplicity and convenience rather than necessity. Both the achievability and the converse proofs may be extended to the case of unequal number of antennas by suitable modifications, following [11] , which considers the WTH with full eavesdropper CSIT and unequal number of antennas at the terminals. The key contribution of this paper is in the converse proofs with no eavesdropper CSIT and using a simplified setup allows us to highlight the key ideas and techniques more clearly.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 by providing an achievable scheme and a converse. Since Theorem 1 implies that the WTH and the MAC-WT channel have the same linear sum s.d.o.f., we first note that it suffices to provide a linear achievable scheme for the WTH, since the MAC-WT channel can be treated as a WTH with time sharing between the users. Also, since any rate achievable for the WTH is achievable for the MAC-WT channel, a converse for the MAC-WT channel suffices as a converse for the WTH as well. Thus, in the following subsections, we provide an achievable scheme for the WTH and a converse for the MAC-WT channel.
A. Achievable Scheme for the WTH
In this section, we provide an achievable scheme for the WTH. In this scheme, the transmitter sends (2N − K ) information symbols reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver in two time slots, in order to achieve
At each time slot, transmitter 1 sends a linear combination of (2N − K ) information symbols v 1 and K artificial noise symbols u 1 as in (9) . Transmitter 2 sends a linear combination of its K artificial noise symbols u 2 . Since transmitter 2 does not have any information symbols v 2 for the WTH, there is no P 2 in that case. The channel outputs can be written compactly as in (12)- (13) as:
It remains to choose the precoding matricesP 1 ,Q 1 andQ 2 appropriately. We make the following selection: 
The decodability of v 1 at the legitimate receiver in the high transmit power regime follows immediately since the matrix [H 1P1 ,Q] has rank 2N by our choice ofP 1 andQ. On the other hand, the number of leakage dimensions L is
where we have used the fact that for any full-rank Q chosen independently ofḠ 1 ,Ḡ 2 , we have that rank
2Q ] = 2K for almost all channel realizations of (Ḡ 1 ,Ḡ 2 ). This follows from the following lemma by noting that each row and each column ofḠ i has at least one entry drawn from a continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion and the matricesH −1 iQ for i = 1, 2 do not depend on theḠ i s. Lemma 2: Let P 1 ∈ R N×m 1 and P 2 ∈ R N×m 2 fixed matrices with ranks p 1 and p 2 , respectively. Let G 1 and G 2 be K × N matrices whose each row and each column has at least one entry that is drawn from some continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion, and the remaining elements are arbitrary but fixed. Then, almost surely,
(38) The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix A.
Therefore, the security requirement in (20) is satisfied as well. This completes the achievable scheme. We remark here that using Lemma 1, it can be easily shown that
An achievable rate for the wiretap channel over two channel uses, R vec is given by [27] 
Therefore, the effective achievable secure rate is 2N − K ) .
B. Converse
In this section, we prove the converse for the MAC-WT channel. To that end, we consider two regimes of K . When 0 ≤ K ≤ N, we prove the converse for general transmission schemes without any restrictions of linearity. For the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N, we prove the converse under the assumption of linear coding schemes only. We also provide a general upper bound in this regime which does not match the achievablity; nevertheless, it shows that there is loss in s.d.o.f. for the WTH and the MAC-WT channel due to no eavesdropper CSIT.
We wish to show that:
Let us first state three lemmas which are useful for the proof. 
Then, for any M ≥ N, the following holds: 
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix B.
Let us now proceed with the converse proof. As in [2] , [8] , [10] , and [11] , we define noisy versions of
The secrecy penalty lemma [2] can then be derived as
The role of a helper lemma [2] also generalizes to the MIMO case as
By symmetry, we also have
Adding (51), (54) and (55), we have
where (57) follows from Lemma 5 and we have used the fact that h(Y n ) ≤ N 2 log P + no(log P). Therefore, we have,
Dividing by 1 2 log P and taking the limit P → ∞, we have
which completes the proof of the converse for the regime 
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix C.
To proceed with the upper bound, first note that since strictly positive sum s.d.o.f. is achievable for the MAC-WT channel using linear schemes, we can safely discard the case d 1 + d 2 = 0 for the purpose of the converse. Therefore, from Lemma 6, the rank of the vector space spanned by the output at the eavesdropper is K n + o(n), i.e.,
We have,
where (64) follows from the decodability constraint, (65) follows from the secrecy constraint (20) , and (66) follows from the following:
The above equalities all hold almost surely sinceH i andḠ i are both full column rank almost surely. Finally, (70) follows from Lemma 6. Now dividing by n and taking limit n → ∞, we have 
(77) The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix D. Now we proceed as in the case of 0 ≤ K ≤ N with the secrecy penalty lemma [2] :
The role of the helper lemma [2] yields, for i = j :
Eliminating h(X n 1 ) and h(X n 2 ) using (83) and (84),
Dividing by n and letting n → ∞, we have
Now dividing by 1 2 log P and letting P → ∞,
Also, 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered two fundamental multi-user channel models: the MIMO WTH and the MIMO MAC-WT channel. In each case, the eavesdropper has K antennas while the remaining terminals have N antennas. We assumed that the CSIT of the legitimate receiver is available but no eavesdropper CSIT is available. We determined the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for each channel model for the regime K ≤ N, and showed that in this regime, the MAC-WT channel reduces to the WTH in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. 
almost surely. On the other hand, when N ≥ K , we have
whereP i is a N × p i submatrix of P i with full column rank. Letp i = min(K , p i ). Now, the determinant of anyp i ×p i submatrix of G iPi is a multi-variate polynomial of the random entries of G i and is zero for only finitely many realizations. Therefore, G iPi has rankp i . Note that when N ≤ K ,p i = p i is satisfied trivially. Therefore, there exists a set I i ⊆ {1, . . . , m i } such that |I i | =p i and the collection of column vectors C i = c i j , j ∈ I i are linearly independent, where c i j denotes the j th column of G i P i . Clearly,
The matrix
The determinant of this submatrix is a multi-variate polynomial function of the random entries of G 1 and G 2 , and therefore, the determinant can be zero for only finitely many realizations, corresponding to the roots of the multi-variate polynomial function. Note that this is true if each row and each column ofḠ i has at least one random entry. Also, the polynomial function is not identically zero. Therefore,
On the other hand, if K ≥p 1 +p 2 , we can consider a
, and using a similar argument, we can claim that
Combining (91), (92) and (93), we have
On the other hand, 
Combining (97) and (103) completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Note that K ≤ N. Consider N − K additional outputsẐ at the eavesdropper as:
where eachĜ i is a (N − K ) × N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from the same continuous distribution as the entries of G i , and the entries ofN 2 are i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that theĜ i s are unavailable at the transmitters.. The enhanced outputZ(t) = (Z(t),Ẑ(t)) is clearly entropy symmetric. Using Lemma 3, we have
Now, since the G i s andĜ i s are not available at the transmitters, using Lemma 4, we have
Combining (105) and (106), we get the desired result that 
where (111) follows from Lemma 2, (112) follows from the decodability requirement, and (113) follows almost surely sinceḠ i is full column rank almost surely as long as K > N. Therefore,
> lim
which contradicts the security requirement in (20) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Consider 2N − K additional outputsẐ at the eavesdropper:
where eachĜ i is a (2N − K ) × N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from the same continuous distribution as the entries of G i , and the entries ofN 2 are i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that theĜ i s are not available at the transmitters either. Then, the enhanced outputZ(t) = (Z(t),Ẑ(t)) is clearly entropy symmetric. Therefore, using Lemma 3, we have
Now, givenZ n , we can decode both inputs X n 1 and X n 2 to within noise variance, and therefore, also Y n and Z n . Thus, we have
Combining (118) and (119), we get the desired result that
